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KANT’S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION: 
EPISTEMIC SOURCES OF SECULARISM 
– Sorin Baiasu –
Abstract. The secular interpretation of Kant is widespread and Kant is viewed as the most prestig-
ious founding father of liberal secularism. At the same time, however, commentators note that 
Kant’s position on secularism is in fact much more complex, and some go as far as to talk about an 
ambiguous secularism in his work. This paper defends a refined version of the secular interpreta-
tion. According to this refined version, Kant can offer a limited, political secularism on the basis of 
a simple argument which focuses on the distinct epistemic statuses of political and religious claims; 
however, the paper argues, a more general secularism is unwarranted on the basis of the same 
argument. If my argument is correct, then it will account at least in part for the plurality of inter-
pretations. Moreover, any further attempt to show that Kant’s relation to secularism is ambiguous 
or dismissive should take into consideration the argument from epistemic grounds presented here. 
Keywords: Kant’s practical philosophy, religion, secularism, belief/faith, justification, moral 
knowledge. 
1. Introduction
As noted in the literature, the secular interpretation of Kant is widespread 
and Kant is viewed as the most prestigious founding father of liberal secularism.1 
At the same time, however, commentators note that Kant’s position on secularism 
is in fact much more complex and some go as far as to talk about an “ambiguous 
secularism” in his work;2 however, if correct, the argument of this paper will ena-
1 Although acknowledging that Kant was a believer, some commentators note “that the conse-
quences – both intended and unintended – of Kant's critical philosophy have had the greatest phil-
osophical influence on making unbelief a legitimate alternative to faith in a transcendent God.” 
Bernstein (2009): 1035. They also remark that “[t]his attempt to privatize religion […] emerged out 
of a series of political and philosophical attempts to manage and moderate sectarianism in Europe-
an politics. No philosopher was more committed to this effort than Immanuel Kant.” Hurd (2008): 
25. Finally, they note: “in Genealogies of Religion, Asad […] discussed Immanuel Kant’s work on
religion. […] Asad’s tracing of the Kantian-secular understanding of ‘religion’ is connected to his 
critique of secularism as a norm for today’s world.” Jansen (2017): 379. 
2 “Though Kant may be considered the most prestigious Father of liberal secularism, my interpreta-
tion of his ideas about the relationships between religion and politics is that they can be profitably 
employed to contrast precisely that widespread form of contemporary Western secularism, which 
maintains that religion is a private matter that should play no role in the design of political institu-
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ble us to identify one possible contributing factor for this complex position, a fac-
tor which is epistemic in character. The argument will proceed as follows. After 
this brief introduction (Section 1), I formulate a simple Kantian epistemic argu-
ment in support of secularism (Section 2), with “secularism” understood in a nar-
row sense.  
Next (Section 3), however, I show how the view of Kant as a supporter of 
this narrow secularism can be questioned, when, together with some recent com-
mentators, we view his account of moral cognition as non-epistemic. This case 
against the simple Kantian epistemic argument for secularism can in its turn be 
objected to, since Kant seems clearly to regard practical justification as providing 
objectively sufficient grounds of assent and, hence, as epistemic. I show, however, 
that the objection is here raised on the basis of a confusion between two types of 
conviction which may be produced by our justifications. Hence, the objection 
to the simple epistemic Kantian argument in support of secularism continues to 
stand. 
Furthermore (Section 4), through focus on the distinction between epistemic 
and non-epistemic justification and a clarification of what the notion of an objec-
tive practical ground can refer to in relation to practical justification and moral 
knowledge, I show that moral knowledge is indeed justified by epistemic practical 
justification and I confirm in this way the Kantian argument for secularism. How-
ever, a further complication can be raised on the basis of some of Kant’s comments 
concerning the postulates of practical reason. These comments suggest that reli-
gious claims are much closer to moral knowledge than initially suggested. Hence, 
we have another objection to the simple Kantian epistemic argument for secular-
ism presented in this paper, an objection which needs consideration; this will 
be the focus in the next section of the paper (Section 5), where the objection will be 
answered.  
Finally, I conclude (Section 6) that the argument in this paper might be suf-
ficient to show what would be wrong in attributing to Kant a broader notion of 
secularism, especially given his view of the postulates of practical reason. If all 
these claims are correct, then any further attempt to question Kant’s political secu-
                                                                                                                                                    
tions and the adoption of political decisions.” Pera (2012): 546; “Although the secular interpretation 
of Kant is widespread, it is belied by a significant share of the Critical corpus. Not only do we find 
powerful defenses of religious belief in all three Critiques, but a considerable share of Kant's work 
in the 1790s is devoted to the positive side of his philosophy of religion.” Pasternack, Rossi (2014). 
Chapter 2 of Emmet Kennedy’s book, Secularism and Its Opponents from Augustine to Solzhenitsyn, is 
titled “Immanuel Kant’s Ambiguous Secularism.” Kennedy (2006): 131. 
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larism would need to take into consideration the argument from epistemic 
grounds presented here.3 
2. An Epistemic Argument for Kant’s Secularism 
If we assume that secularism is understood, relatively uncontroversially, as 
the separation of political institutions and representatives from religious arrange-
ments and dignitaries,4 then secularism seems to be a direct implication of two 
important claims of Kant’s philosophy. There is, first, the claim that religious 
statements cannot express knowledge, but are only expressions of faith or belief. 
As such, they are objectively insufficient statements. There is, secondly, the claim 
that a standard, which can guide us in the political organisation of a society, is 
right if it is justifiable to all those affected. This condition of justifiability, however, 
is an implication of the objective character of the statements which express such 
standards and which Kant regards as knowledge statements. It follows that any 
rules and practices which define political institutions and the role of political rep-
resentatives will need to be objective. Yet, given the first claim (concerning the in-
sufficient objectivity of religious claims), we can conclude that political institutions 
and representatives will indeed be separate from religious arrangements and dig-
nitaries, which is exactly the secularist position presented above (secularism in the 
narrow sense5). 
The epistemic grounds of this conclusion are provided by Kant’s distinction 
between knowledge [Wissen], belief/faith [Glauben] and opinion [Meinen], together 
with his more subtle distinction between knowledge [Wissen] and cognition 
[Erkenntnis].6 Kant begins the section “On Opinion, Knowledge and Faith” with 
a characterisation of assent or, literally, holding-for-true [Fürwahrhalten]. Assent is 
                                                 
3 I agree with Tomaszewska’s argument (“Kant almost dilutes the contents of religious belief in an 
ethical doctrine which he projects to be endorseable by everyone. This, to my mind, takes him clos-
er to some ‘radical’ tendencies in the Enlightenment than many commentators would be inclined to 
admit”) [Tomaszewska (2017): 125], but I think the crucial element in her claim is the “almost”: if 
my argument in this paper is right, then there is a fundamental difference between the epistemic 
statuses of religious and ethical claims in Kant, and this difference is the ground of the limited, 
political secularism, which is the focus of this paper. 
4 I think this position can be specified further in an uncontroversial way, since this separation 
marks in fact the lack of a relation of dependence: political institutions and representatives are 
independent from religious arrangements and dignitaries. A non-secular, religious state is one 
where the dependence holds to some extent at least. 
5 A broader secularism will assert this link between institutions and religious arrangements beyond 
the political sphere. At the extreme, a communist state, such as the Soviet Union, would try to ex-
clude religion from all aspects of society, including the social, cultural, and economic ones.  
6 For certain aspects of this paper, I draw on my Baiasu (2013). 
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important in this context, since knowledge, belief/faith, and opinion are all forms 
of assent. When I am of the opinion, or I believe, or know, that X is the case, then 
I assent to X’s being the case, although with different degrees of confidence. As-
sent is presented by Kant as “an event in our understanding,” an event that “may 
rest on objective bases but that also requires subjective causes in the mind of the 
person who is judging.”7 Hence, the “subjective causes” are necessary for assent, 
whereas the objective bases may or may not be present. When I assent to a claim, 
I may assert it on the basis of sufficient objective evidence, I may be persuaded by 
it even when sufficient evidence is lacking or I may take the claim to be possible, 
but neither be convinced by it, nor judge it as objectively justified. The attitude 
which I display in all these three cases, a positive attitude towards the claim, is the 
subjective cause of assent. A subjective cause of assent may also be present when 
I am inventing something arbitrarily, yet, Kant says, this would not amount even 
to an opinion, since opinion requires “a connection with truth.”8 Although opinion 
has a connection with truth, it is an assent consciously insufficient both subjective-
ly and objectively. If the assent is sufficient only subjectively and is regarded as 
objectively insufficient, then the assent is called faith or belief. Finally, knowledge 
is the assent that is sufficient both subjectively and objectively.9  
Moral judgements (including ethical and political claims), Kant says, issue 
from pure reason, and he thinks they cannot be held as opinion. Thus, since they 
are not based on experience, but on pure reason, such judgements are necessary 
and universal, so they can only be knowledge and provide certainty. Thus, for 
Kant, it is absurd to have opinion in pure mathematics and, he adds, the “same 
applies to the principles of morality, where one must not venture upon an action 
on the mere opinion that something is permitted, but must know this to be permit-
ted.”10 By contrast, judgements that are the result of a “transcendental use of rea-
son” can be neither opinion nor knowledge –“holding an opinion,” Kant says, “is 
indeed too little, but knowing is again too much.”11 Reason in its transcendental 
                                                 
7 KrV, A 820/B 848: “eine Begebenheit in unserem Verstande”; “auf objektive Gründen beruhen 
mag, aber auch subjektive Ursachen im Gemüte dessen, der da urteilt, erfordert.” In citing Kant’s 
works the abbreviations listed below will be used. Pagination references in the text and footnotes 
are to the volume and page number in the German edition of Kant’s works (1900–). References to 
the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) follow the A (first edition), B (second edition) convention. Transla-
tions used are listed in the bibliography. 
8 KrV, A 822/B 850: “eine Verknüpfung mit Wahrheit.” 
9 Ibidem. 
10 KrV, A 823/B 851: “Eben so ist es mit den Grundsätzen der Sittlichkeit bewandt, da man nicht 
auf bloße Meinung, daß etwas erlaubt sei, eine Handlung wagen darf, sondern dieses wissen muß.” 
11 Ibidem: “Im transzendentalen Gebrauche der Vernunft ist dagegen Meinen freilich zu wenig, 
aber Wissen auch zu viel.” 
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use goes beyond the limits of sensible intuition – whether a priori or a posteriori – 
and makes a theoretical claim about things of which we cannot have experience. 
One such thing is the existence of God, and theism will thus be a position which 
will therefore be assented to neither as opinion nor as knowledge.  
Now, in order for judgements concerning transcendent objects to be classed 
under the category of belief or faith, Kant says that a practical reference is needed. 
This practical reference or aim can be either of skill (for contingent and optional 
purposes) or of morality (for absolutely necessary purposes).12 Kant distinguishes 
between pragmatic and necessary faith/belief. The example Kant offers here is 
that of a physician who must do something for a patient who is in danger. The 
physician, on the basis of the evidence at her disposal, judges that the patient suf-
fers from a certain illness (more exactly, consumption), but she is not acquainted 
with the illness so her conclusion is drawn in the absence of anything better. Her 
belief/faith in the treatment she provides is a pragmatic, contingent one, accord-
ing to Kant. A pragmatic belief is contingent, but underlies our actual use of the 
means for certain actions.13  
In addition, Kant distinguishes between two types of necessity that the 
conditions which are required for the realisation of a purpose may have. In gen-
eral, these conditions are hypothetically necessary and subjectively sufficient. Yet, 
when I focus on certain conditions, because I do not know any other under which 
the purpose could be attained, they are subjectively sufficient, but only compara-
tively. By contrast, if I know with certainty that there are no other better condi-
tions under which the purpose could be attained, then their necessity would be 
subjectively sufficient absolutely and for everyone.14 
When a claim does not state a hypothetically necessary condition for attain-
ing a certain purpose, the assent to the claim is merely theoretical. Even in this 
case, Kant adds, we can imagine in a merely theoretical judgement an analogue of 
practical judgement. We can imagine that, if there were a way of establishing 
whether the claim was correct or not, we could test our faith/belief in the truth of 
the claim through a bet. The example Kant offers is that of the existence of extra-
terrestrial beings. A bet would enable us to establish whether we deal with opin-
ion or with faith/belief. Kant calls the assent to such a merely theoretical judge-
ment doctrinal faith.15 
                                                 
12 Ibidem. See also the Conclusion to Rechtslehre, MS RL, AA 6:354–355. 
13 KrV, A 824/B 852. 
14 KrV, A 823-824/B 851–852. 
15 KrV, A 825/B 854. 
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Interestingly, Kant says that the existence of God, which is a theoretical 
judgement, belongs to doctrinal faith. This is interesting, since the existence of God 
is also the claim of one of the two postulates of practical reason, for which Kant 
thinks that the justification relies on moral grounds. By contrast, in the case of 
a doctrinal belief, the assent is not moral, but theoretical. Kant thinks there are 
theoretical reasons for asserting the existence of God. This is because our cognition 
of appearances requires the condition of purposive unity, something Kant thinks 
experience richly illustrates. 
He thinks this purposive unity is necessarily made possible by a supreme 
intelligence, but he takes this unity to be necessary for a “contingent,” although 
“not unimportant” aim, namely, to have guidance in the investigation of nature.16 
After noting that a similar argument can be formulated about a claim concerning 
the immortality of the soul, which would be derived from the doctrinal faith in the 
existence of God, Kant reflects on the status of faith/belief, which he thinks com-
bines an expression of modesty from an objective point of view with one of firm-
ness of confidence from a subjective viewpoint. 
Given the support that merely doctrinal faith/belief can obtain and given 
that speculation sometimes drives one away from this faith/belief and gives the 
illusion of knowledge, there is something shaky about doctrinal faith/belief. By 
contrast, moral faith starts from the absolute necessity that something must occur 
(more exactly, the absolute necessity of complying with the moral law). Here the 
purpose is no longer merely contingent, but necessary or “inescapably estab-
lished.”17 But, Kant says, there is a single condition under which this purpose co-
heres with the entirety of all purposes and thereby has practical validity – the 
condition that there is God and a future world, which are the two postulates of 
practical reason. In addition, I know that no one else is acquainted with other con-
ditions that would lead to the same unity of purposes under the moral law. Since 
this moral command should also be my maxim, I will inevitably have faith/belief 
in the existence of God and in a future life.18 To shake this faith would be to shake 
                                                 
16 KrV, A 826/B 854: “zufälligen […] unerheblichen.” 
17 KrV, A 828/B 856: “unumgänglich festgestellt.” 
18 The postulates of practical reason are presented in detail in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason; the 
argumentative strategy there seems to be the following (although there are debates as to whether it 
works, especially given Kant’s idea of a fact of reason): the moral law can be derived from the fact 
of reason; yet, the moral law and the virtuous actions which are performed when acting on the 
moral law are only part of the highest-complete good; the other part is happiness, which must be 
viewed as part of the highest good as in accordance with virtue. Kant thinks that there are two 
obstacles which make difficult our realisation of the highest-complete good: time for our moral 
improvement and power to distribute happiness in accordance with virtue. The postulates of the 
existence of God and immortality of the soul are supposed to make possible the highest-complete 
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my moral principles, “which I cannot renounce without being detestable in my 
own eyes.”19 
As a preliminary conclusion, it can be noted that there is a stark difference 
between moral claims, which are knowledge claims, and religious claims, which 
are belief or faith claims. Given that belief or faith claims are objectively insuffi-
cient forms of assent, they cannot function as a ground for the rules and practices 
which govern political arrangements and institutional roles, since, as knowledge 
claims, these are objectively sufficient forms of assent. These rules and practices 
must therefore have distinct normative origins. Yet, this is exactly the requirement 
for a secularist organisation of society: the separation of political institutions and 
representatives from religious arrangements and dignitaries. While the case for 
secularism in Kant seems easy to be defended, in the next section we will see that 
complications arise from the same epistemic grounds. 
3. Undermining the Case for Kant’s Secularism 
I have claimed that one argument in support of Kant’s secularism starts 
from the difference in the epistemic status of religious and moral claims. Given 
that, on Kant’s account, a society should be organised politically on the basis of 
moral principles, the distinct epistemic status of religious and moral claims im-
plies that religious arrangements and dignitaries cannot be seen as linked to polit-
ical institutions and representatives. On the contrary, given the supposed objective 
character of moral-political norms, no justification of these norms can be made on 
the basis of the subjective character of religious claims. 
There is one issue, however, which seems to undermine this argument. 
More recently, in the literature on Kant’s account of justification, it has been 
claimed that Kant’s practical cognition, including that expressed by moral judge-
ments, is non-epistemic. Given that non-epistemic judgements are expressions of 
rational beliefs or faith, rather than of knowledge claims, the barrier between polit-
ical and religious arrangements (namely that between their objectively sufficient 
and, respectively, insufficient character), as presented in the previous section, 
would dissolve and the argument for Kant’s political philosophy as secularist 
would be seriously undermined.  
                                                                                                                                                    
good and, hence, to preserve my moral principles unshaken (at least with respect to their possible 
realisation). 
19 KrV, A 828/B 856: “denen ich nicht entsagen kann, ohne in meinen eigenen Augen 
verabscheuungswürdig zu sein.” 
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Consider Chignell’s account of justification in Kant.20 By “justification,” 
Chignell means “the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which 
a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of 
confidence.”21 Hence, according to this definition, the object of justification is 
a propositional attitude, the process of justification consists in determining wheth-
er the propositional attitude meets the conditions of rational acceptability, and the 
status of justified propositional attitude is reached when rational acceptability has 
a sufficient (moderate to high) degree of confidence. 
As we have seen, the propositional attitude that Kant considers is assent 
[Fürwahrhalten]. If the basis of assent is objectively sufficient, Kant says, then we 
deal with conviction, which is valid for everyone; Kant contrasts conviction with 
persuasion, which is an assent with bases only in the particular characteristics of 
the person who holds it.22 Truth, Kant notes, rests on agreement with the object. 
This implies that the judgments every understanding articulates about an object 
must be in agreement. Hence, one way to test whether assent is conviction or mere 
persuasion is through the possibility of communicating the assent and finding it to 
be valid for every rational being. Subjectively, that is, as an appearance of his own 
mind, persuasion cannot be distinguished from conviction, Kant claims. But the 
bases of the assent that are valid for me can be tested on the understanding of the 
others to see whether they have the same effect on them. If the subjectively partic-
ular causes of the judgment are identified, then we expose the status of assent as 
persuasion.23 To assert something, Kant says, I must take the judgment I formulate 
as objectively valid for all and, hence, as conviction. If I know that the judgment is 
merely valid for me and, hence, as persuasion, I should not try to assert it.  
Now, according to Chignell, Kant employs both epistemic and non- 
-epistemic concepts of justification.24 The epistemic concept refers to assent under 
conditions that are sufficient for rational acceptability, and when the object of as-
sent is a candidate for knowledge. The non-epistemic notion refers to pragmatic or 
practical conditions, which guarantee for assent sufficient rational acceptability, 
but not the status of candidate for knowledge, even if the object of assent is true. 
The rational acceptance licensed in this way is from a practical point of view. 
                                                 
20 Chignell (2007). 
21 Ibidem: 33. 
22 KrV, A 820/B 848. 
23 KrV, A 821/B 849. 
24 Chignell (2007): 34. 
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Epistemic justification refers to objective conditions of rational acceptability 
for assent that is also a candidate for knowledge. Since Kant refers to these 
knowledge candidates as convictions, epistemic justification consists of (objective) 
conditions of rational acceptability of convictions. Non-epistemic justification, 
by contrast, includes all practical conditions of rational acceptability. I am going 
to call this type of justification, which consists of practical conditions of rational 
acceptability, practical justification. However, if we follow Chignell’s distinction 
between epistemic and non-epistemic justification, the implication is that practical 
justification is non-epistemic. 
But, if practical justification is non-epistemic, then Kant’s practical or moral 
epistemology could not include a notion of justification, since paradoxically, as 
part of a practical epistemology, this notion of justification would have to be prac-
tical, in which case it could no longer be epistemic and, hence, part of an episte-
mology. And a practical epistemology without a notion of justification would be 
a strange account of practical knowledge. I have dealt with this problem else-
where.25 My main concern here is with one implication of this distinction between 
epistemic and non-epistemic justification and of the non-epistemic character of 
practical justification. For, if practical justification in general, including that 
of moral norms, is non-epistemic, then the worry is that the distinction drawn ear-
lier between the normative status of moral claims and that of religious claims is 
not as clear as presented, and the simple case for Kant’s secularism begins to be-
come shaky. 
One possible reply to this objection is that, respectively, the epistemic or 
non-epistemic character of the justification of theoretical and practical claims in 
Kant is not what is crucial; what is crucial is the extent to which the non-epistemic 
justification of moral norms has an objectively sufficient force, in contrast to the 
objectively insufficient character of the justification of religious claims. But, in or-
der for this reply to work, we would need to investigate further what is specific for 
epistemic justification and whether classing practical justification as non-epistemic 
deprives it of its objectively sufficient character. 
Before examining further the distinction between epistemic and non- 
-epistemic justification, let us consider one argument in support of the reply I have 
just formulated, namely, that the practical justification of moral norms, although 
non-epistemic, has nevertheless an objectively sufficient force. Recall that, accord-
ing to Kant, if the basis of assent is objectively sufficient, then we deal with convic-
tion, which is valid for everyone; moreover, conviction is distinct from persuasion, 
                                                 
25 Baiasu (2013). 
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which is an assent with bases only in the particular characteristics of the person 
who holds it.26 Because Kant does talk about conviction in relation to practical jus-
tification, it follows that the basis of assent provided by practical justification can 
be objectively sufficient. The distinction between moral norms and religious 
claims would in this way be easily vindicated, and the attempt to undermine the 
argument offered in this paper for Kant’s secularism would be rejected.  
For instance, in the third Critique, in relation to a certain type of proof, Kant 
says: 
[...] if it is based on a practical principle of reason (which therefore holds universal-
ly and necessarily), then it may indeed claim to convince sufficiently from a pure 
practical point of view.27 
Hence, if that which gives rise to conviction is practical justification, then, given 
that conviction requires objectively sufficient grounds, perhaps we can maintain 
the argument that religious claims cannot ground moral claims, since the latter, 
unlike the former, are based on objectively sufficient grounds. 
In response, one can first point to the fact that Kant’s discussion of convic-
tion in the First Critique only suggests that typically a conviction is a candidate for 
the status of knowledge. The implication then is that some convictions need not be 
candidates for the status of knowledge. Hence, the suggestion is that, although 
one may talk about convictions in relation to practical cognition, those convictions 
are not candidates to knowledge and, hence, are not objectively sufficient. 
The implication, then, is to pay attention to Kant’s distinction between two 
types of conviction, only one of which is a candidate for the status of knowledge. 
Reference here can be made quite easily to Kant’s Lectures on Logic, in particular 
the Jäsche Logic: 
[…] we can now draw the universal result that all our conviction is thus either logi-
cal or practical. When we know, namely, that we are free of all subjective grounds 
and yet the holding-to-be-true [assent—Fürwahrhaltung] is sufficient, then we are 
convinced, and in fact logically convinced, or convinced on objective grounds (the ob-
ject is certain). 
Complete holding-to-be-true [assent] on subjective grounds, which in a practical re-
lation hold just as much as objective grounds, is also conviction, though not logical 
                                                 
26 KrV, A 820/B 848. 
27 KU, AA 5:463: “legt er aber ein praktisches Vernunftprinzip zum Grunde (welches mithin allge-
mein und notwendig gilt), so darf er wohl auf eine, in reiner praktischer Absicht hinreichende […] 
Überzeugung Anspruch machen.” 
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but rather practical conviction (I am certain). And this practical conviction, or this 
moral belief of reason [moralische Vernunftglaube], is often firmer than all knowledge. 
With knowledge one still listens to opposed grounds, but not with belief [Glaube], 
because here it does not depend on objective grounds but on the moral interest of 
the subject.28  
According to this distinction, logical conviction is conviction based on objective 
grounds, which are sufficient without the contribution of subjective grounds. Prac-
tical conviction, by contrast, is based on subjective grounds; one is convinced (in 
a practical relation) that something must be the case as a means to a specific end. 
Consequently, one could explain how Kant can talk about conviction in relation to 
practical justification: what he has in mind is practical, not logical conviction. Yet, 
if epistemic justification is given by logical conviction which is, thus, not mere 
conviction, but also a candidate for knowledge, then practical justification is not 
epistemic, although it may well ground conviction (that is, practical conviction). 
Consequently, epistemic justification concerns logical conviction and sometimes 
turns such conviction into knowledge if that which the conviction is about (the 
claim or assertion) is true. 
In this way, the argument in support of the reply is rejected: practical con-
viction, although associated by Kant with the justification of practical principles, 
does not provide objectively sufficient grounds. Moreover, we seem to be able to 
reject the reply itself, since non-epistemic justification does not seem to provide 
objectively sufficient moral bases for practical judgements; if all this is correct, 
then we are back to the initial objection to the case for Kant’s secularism. In fact, 
however, the reply cannot be rejected so quickly. What we have actually shown is 
that the non-epistemic justification which produces practical conviction cannot 
obtain the status of a candidate for knowledge. What we need to determine at this 
point is whether the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic justification 
in general (and not merely that which affords practical conviction) deprives prac-
tical justification of the ability to provide support which is objectively sufficient. 
                                                 
28 Log, AA 9:72: “können wir nun das allgemeine Resultat ziehen: daß also alle unsre Überzeugung 
entweder logisch oder praktisch sei. – Nämlich wenn wir wissen, daß wir frei sind von allen subjek-
tiven Gründen und doch das Fürwahrhalten zureichend ist, so sind wir überzeugt und zwar logisch 
oder aus objektiven Gründen überzeugt (das Objekt ist gewiß). 
Das komplette Fürwahrhalten aus subjektiven Gründen, die in praktischer Beziehung so viel als ob-
jektive gelten, ist aber aucch Überzeugung, nur nicht logische, sondern praktische (ich bin gewiß). 
Und diese praktische Überzeugung oder dieser moralischer Vernunftglaube ist oft fester als alles 
Wissen. Beim wissen hört man noch auf Gegengründe, aber beim Glauben nicht; weil es hierbei 
nicht auf objektive Gründe, sondern aus das moralische Interesse des Subjekts ankommt.” 
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Only then can we say that practical justification in general is non-epistemic. So the 
next step is to investigate in more detail the distinction between epistemic and 
non-epistemic justification.  
Kant specifies that assent may rest on objective bases, but also requires sub-
jective causes in the mind of the person who is judging.29 As I have already men-
tioned above, this means that, even when epistemic justification can show that 
assent is objectively sufficient or sufficient on objective grounds, we still need sub-
jective causes in the mind of the person who has the assent. 
According to Chignell, one way to understand the subjective cause for as-
sent when we deal with knowledge is as recognition that assent is based on objec-
tively sufficient grounds.30 Subjectively sufficient assent is then defined through 
a series of conditions: that such assent need not imply reflection, that it should not 
involve an infinite regress (due to the fact that recognition can be understood as 
involving subjective assent), that it should make conceptual room for persuasion 
(subjectively sufficient assent where the grounds for assent may be bad), and that 
it should avoid a case where assent is not well founded. Since subjectively suffi-
cient assent depends on objectively sufficient assent (since subjectively sufficient 
assent includes the recognition that assent is based on sufficient objective 
grounds), we need both notions.  
These two notions (call them OS and SS1) constitute epistemic assent, which 
is then contrasted with non-epistemic assent. Recall that, since my aim here is to 
examine the extent to which practical justification can be epistemic in character 
and, hence, involve, for the case of moral standards, objectively sufficient grounds, 
one important step is precisely to examine the difference between these notions of 
epistemic and non-epistemic assent. Specific for non-epistemic assent is that it 
cannot be objectively sufficient, since this would place it under the notion of objec-
tively sufficient assent, which has an epistemic character. For this reason, we are 
going to find under the category of non-epistemic assent only subjectively suffi-
cient grounds of assent. Chignell identifies two such notions (call them SS2 and 
SS3), which are analogous to the epistemic ones. One of these notions (SS2) con-
cerns subjectively sufficient assent in virtue of a non-epistemic merit which the 
claim assented to has for a person, a merit which is a subjectively sufficient 
ground. The second notion (SS3) is similar, but it involves recognition that the non- 
-epistemic merit the claim assented to has is sufficient for the assent.31 
                                                 
29 KrV, A 820/B 848. 
30 Chignell (2007): 44. 
31 For the full details, see Chignell (2007): 46–56; for discussion, see Baiasu (2013): 34–36. 
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According to Chignell, knowledge requires the first two notions of assent, 
rational belief requires the third and reflective belief requires the fourth and final 
one. If we look at the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic assent, 
which is the starting point of my discussion in this section, we can see that the ob-
jective grounds of assent give the mark of the epistemic. Whether epistemic or 
non-epistemic, assent can be subjectively sufficient, but the difference between the 
second notion of subjectively sufficient assent, which refers to epistemic assent, 
and the third and fourth, which refer to non-epistemic assent, is that the agent 
would regard the support for assent as an objective ground in the former case and 
as having some (subjective) merit in the latter cases (for instance, the ground of 
assent could be that the judgement assented to furthers our moral interest).  
This seems to suggest that the argument for Kant’s secularism presented in 
Section 1 is now clearly undermined. Thus, I have argued that the way in which 
Kant’s limited secularism can be defended is by making clear the distinct epistem-
ic statuses of moral standards and religious claims. Yet, given that both these 
types of claim are considered as requiring practical justification and given that 
practical justification seems to be non-epistemic, the distinction is weakened and 
the initial case for political secularism in Kant is undermined. In the next section, 
however, the distinction between objective ground and subjective merit will be 
investigated in more detail and a defence of the case for secularism will be provid-
ed. 
4. Epistemic Practical Justification  
The best way to understand the distinction between objective ground and 
subjective merit for assent is to clarify the notion of objective ground.32 We can 
begin with a quote from the Blomberg Logic, which provides a definition of ground 
as that from which something can be cognized.33 We can then look at Kant’s First 
Critique for a definition of objective ground: that which provides reliable infor-
mation about the constitution of the object or state of affairs described by some 
proposition.34 This is in line with what Kant says in the Jäsche Logic, as already 
quoted above: unlike knowledge, belief [Glaube] “does not depend on objective 
grounds but on the moral interest of the subject.”35 Knowledge [Wissen] is here 
                                                 
32 Chignell discusses this in his 2007 text on page 39. 
33 V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24:42. 
34 KrV, A 821/B 849. 
35 Log, AA 9:72: “es hierbei nicht auf objective Gründe, sondern aus das moralische Interesse des 
Subjekts ankommt.” 
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firmly associated with the idea of objective ground, whereas faith/belief [Glaube] – 
with moral interests. This, however, seems to be in tension with other claims Kant 
makes in the same work and which are also echoed elsewhere. 
For instance, in discussing the assent presupposed by faith/belief [Glauben], 
he excludes as possible objects of faith/belief those “objects of cognition by reason 
(cognition a priori), whether theoretical, e.g., in mathematics and metaphysics, or 
practical, in morals.”36 This suggests that we can have objective grounds in the 
case of practical philosophy: insofar as a ground is that from which something can 
be cognized, practical cognition a priori will need objective grounds; insofar as an 
objective ground provides reliable information about the constitution of an object, 
the grounds we have in morality will have to provide reliable information about 
the constitution of the objects cognized by practical reason. 
Once we accept that we can have knowledge in the practical domain, we al-
so need to accept that practical justification is part of the category of epistemic jus-
tification or that of the ground of epistemic assent. In fact, in the Jäsche Logic, 
among others, Kant explicitly says that we do have practical knowledge: “Nothing 
could be more ridiculous than, e.g., only to opine in mathematics. Here, as in met-
aphysics and in morals, the rule is either to know or not to know.”37 
The question is, then, how it is possible to have objective grounds in practi-
cal philosophy. The problem in practical philosophy is that our claims are about 
what ought to be the case, rather than about what is the case. Since what is the 
case may not be what ought to be the case (say, the action I am witnessing is not 
the action that ought to have been performed), we cannot derive our practical 
claims from our theoretical claims. If so, our practical claims are a priori and, more 
exactly, they are claims formulated by practical reason. But a priori claims formu-
lated by reason usually refer to objects of which we can have no knowledge. This 
is the case for the claims concerning the existence of God or the immortality of the 
soul, which are theoretical claims which refer to the unconditioned and, hence, 
which we can think only with the help of the a priori ideas of reason. Yet, given 
that our experience is only of conditioned aspects of the world, we cannot know 
whether there is anything that corresponds to these ideas. As Kant puts it, “it is 
                                                 
36 Log, AA 9:68: “auch keine Objekte des Vernunfterkenntnisses (Erkenntnisses a apriori), weder 
des theoretischen, z. B. in der Mathematik und Metaphysik; noch des praktischen in der Moral”; 
see also KrV, A 822–823/B 850–851. 
37 Log, AA 9:67: “Auch könnte in der Tat nichts lächerlicher sein, als z. B. in der Mathematik nur zu 
Meinen. Hier, so wie in der Metaphysik und Moral, gilt es: entweder zu wissen oder nicht zu wissen”; 
see also KrV, A 823/B 851. 
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intrinsically impossible to exhibit rational ideas in intuition, and hence also intrin-
sically impossible to prove theoretically that they are possible.”38 
There is however one exception: the idea of freedom. Kant makes this claim 
in various places, but I will focus on what he says in the third Critique. In “On 
What Kind of Assent Results from a Practical Faith,” he starts by defining matters 
of fact as “objects of concepts whose objective reality can be proved.”39 He speci-
fies that proving the objective reality of concepts can be done either by reason 
(a priori) or by experience (a posteriori), and, in the former case, either from theoret-
ical or from practical data of reason. At any rate, Kant adds, this proof will be pro-
vided by an intuition corresponding to the data. 
Now, the reality of the idea of freedom is established through practical laws 
of pure reason and, if we act on these laws, we can establish the reality of the idea 
in the actual acts and, hence, in experience. This, Kant says, is possible through the 
concept of causality, which we think in the idea of freedom. Given the concept of 
causality and the effects freedom seems to have in nature in the form of moral ac-
tions, we can conclude that freedom has objective reality. Moreover, in this way, 
freedom expands reason beyond the bounds within which any concept of nature 
would have to remain confined. In other words, nature and our knowledge of na-
ture are related to sensibility; although freedom cannot be the object of sensible 
intuition, its effects (moral, free actions) are objects of experience.40 
But if the object corresponding to the concept of freedom has objective reali-
ty, then claims about this object can be supported with reliable information about 
the constitution of this object. Yet, this is precisely the idea of an objective ground, 
which, as we have seen, is the mark of the epistemic. Of course, there are differ-
ences between objects of experience and the object corresponding to the idea of 
freedom, but there are also significant similarities. For instance, according to Kant, 
we know the object corresponding to the concept of freedom by thinking of it as 
a cause, and determining it both through its effects (which are objects of experi-
ence) and through the laws of this causality (moral principles, which regulate the 
effects of freedom). 
Some entities in the sciences, initially hypothesized to account for certain 
phenomena, may come to be known through their effects and through the laws 
which regulate the occurrence of those effects, although they may not be perceiva-
                                                 
38 KU, AA 5:468: “die [eine Vernunftidee] sich an keiner Darstellung in der Anschauung, mithin 
auch keiner theoretischen Beweises ihre Möglichkeit, fähig ist.” 
39 Ibidem: “Gegenstände für Begriffe, deren objektive Realität […] bewiesen werden kann.” 
40 KU, AA 5:474. 
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ble either directly or indirectly through the senses. To be sure, as I said, there are 
also significant differences. For instance, the reasons why certain causes in the sci-
ences may not be directly or indirectly perceivable through the senses is distinct 
from the reason why the object corresponding to the idea of freedom is not. In the 
former case, we may deal with entities that are too small to be directly perceivable, 
and the instruments of observation may affect their indirect observation. In the 
latter case, the object is by definition beyond the conditions which make sensibility 
and perceiveability possible.41 
Although in the case of moral actions Kant says that we can perceive them, 
what we can perceive are those features which may also characterize evil or mor-
ally indifferent actions. Imagine, for instance, an evil person who performs actions 
that conform to moral standards in order to get the others to trust him. Imagine 
also a person who performs by accident an action that conforms to the relevant 
moral standard. The actions we perceive are indistinguishable from the same ac-
tions performed out of duty by a moral agent, and yet the performing agent may 
be evil. The reason why we deal with knowledge and epistemic justification in 
both cases, in spite of the dissimilarity between moral judgements, which are prac-
tical, and theoretical cognition, is given by the modality involved in their deontic 
status: moral judgements can represent knowledge, since they refer to statements 
of what ought to be the case; unlike theoretical knowledge, which asserts what is 
the case (and, for a priori knowledge, what necessarily is the case), moral 
knowledge states our obligations. 
Obligations constitute the objects of practical reason – the good and the evil 
(which are, of course, instantiated by particular good and evil actions). The objec-
tive grounds of practical knowledge do indeed provide reliable information about 
the constitution of the objects or states of affairs described by practical proposi-
tions. This is because practical propositions are about what ought to be the case or 
what ought not to be the case, and their justification is provided a priori by pure 
practical reason. Because they describe potentially actual good or evil actions, 
which are the objects of practical reason, and because pure practical reason pro-
vides reliable information (through the moral law and its application to particular 
cases) about the constitution of these objects, our practical claims can be regarded 
                                                 
41 This is mainly related to Kant’s principle of opacity of our motivation; if freedom is manifested 
through actions motivated by respect for the moral law, given that we can never be sure of the 
nature of our motivations (whether they were indeed ethically worthy motivations promoted only 
by respect or they were motivations provided by various contingent interests and inclinations – see 
GMS, AA 4:407), we can never be sure whether our actions are free or not. But this is not a major 
problem here, since what we need is not some evidence of free actions, but of valid moral stand-
ards. 
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as offering a form of assent which is objectively and subjectively sufficient, that is, 
(practical) knowledge.  
It follows that, if the mark of the epistemic justification is that objective 
grounds constitute it, then at least certain types of practical justification are epis-
temic. Specifically, as I have argued so far, justification of moral principles is 
epistemic, since moral principles are items of practical knowledge as laws of the 
causality of freedom. If we contrast the objectively sufficient claims expressed by 
moral principles with the objectively insufficient ones of religious statements, then 
we have a clear argument for Kant’s political secularism. For political institutions 
and roles are based on juridical rules, which, for Kant are moral in character and, 
hence, are objectively sufficient. There is, however, one further complication, 
which arises when we consider Kant’s argument that not only claims concerning 
freedom are epistemic, but even claims related to the other two ideas of reasons, 
that of God and of the soul. If religious claims also turn out to be epistemic, then 
we are back to the worry that the epistemic statuses of moral norms and religious 
claims are not sufficiently distinct to provide an argument for limited secularism. 
Nevertheless, before concluding my argument, in the next section I will show why 
the nature of Kant’s argument here makes it the case that his political secularism is 
not thereby challenged. This will also make clearer why the literature on this as-
pect of Kant’s philosophy ends up with conclusions which are in tension, if not 
directly contradictory. 
5. An Extension of Pure Reason 
Kant famously states that the existence of God and the immortality of the 
soul (the postulates of practical reason) are theoretical claims, which cannot be 
considered knowledge, but are matters of faith or belief. In the remainder of this 
section I would like to argue that, even if we focus on practical postulates, it can 
still be demonstrated that the grounds provided in support of the postulates should 
be regarded as constitutive of epistemic justification. Nevertheless, I will conclude 
that this is not a challenge for the argument concerning Kant’s political secularism, 
but illustrates the difficulties of interpreting Kant’s position in relation to secular-
ism and points to a possible factor which prompts the diversity of positions in the 
literature. 
I would like to go back to the second Critique, to Chapter VII of the “Dialec-
tic of Pure Practical Reason.” This chapter examines “[h]ow it is possible to think 
an expansion of pure reason for a practical aim without thereby also expanding its 
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cognition as speculative.”42 At the beginning of this chapter, Kant explains how 
pure cognition can be expanded practically: what we need, he says, is an a priori 
aim or purpose that is presented as practically necessary independently from all 
theoretical principles. This purpose, he continues, is possible only if three theoreti-
cal concepts are presupposed as possible, although no intuition can correspond to 
them (since they are ideas of pure reason) and, hence, no objective reality can 
be attributed to them by following the “theoretical path.”43 These three ideas 
(freedom, immortality, and God) are postulated as possible through the practical 
law, which presents the purpose as practically necessary. 
I take it, however, that the crucial claim Kant makes is the following: 
By this, then, the theoretical cognition of pure reason does of course acquire an 
increase, which however consists merely in this: that those concepts which are 
otherwise problematic (merely thinkable), are now assertorically declared to be 
concepts to which objects actually belong, because practical reason unavoidably 
requires the existence of these for the possibility of its object […], which moreover 
is absolutely necessary practically, and theoretical reason is thereby entitled to 
presuppose them.44 
According to Kant’s argument here, the justification of the postulates of practical 
reason does not merely entitle us to a moral faith or belief in immortality and the 
existence of God, we are also entitled to limited theoretical cognition that the con-
cepts corresponding to the ideas of reason are not merely problematic (thinkable), 
but also assertoric (declarable as concepts to which objects actually belong). It is 
this that may seem to challenge the initial argument for secularism presented in 
this paper, since it suggests that some religious claims may also be objectively suf-
ficient. 
Nevertheless, Kant hastens to add that we cannot make use of this expan-
sion of the theoretical cognition of pure reason to obtain “an expansion of specula-
                                                 
42 KpV, AA 5:134–141: “Wie eine Erweiterung der reinen Vernunft, in praktischer Absicht, ohne 
damit ihr Erkenntnis, als spekulativ, zugleich zu erweitern, zu denken möglich sei?” 
43 KpV, AA 5:134: “theoretischen Wege.” 
44 Ibidem: “wodurch denn die theoretische Erkenntnis der reinen Vernunft allerdings einen 
Zuwachs bekommt, der aber bloß darin besteht, daß jene für sie sonst problematische (bloß 
denkbare) Begriffe jetzt assertorisch für solche erklärt werden, denen wirklich Objekte zukommen, 
weil praktische Vernunft die Existenz derselben zur Möglichkeit ihres, und zwar praktisch-
schlechthin notwendigen, Objekts […] unvermeidlich bedarf, und die theoretische dadurch 
berechtigt wird, sie vorauszusetzen.” 
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tion, i.e., no positive use can now be made of it for a theoretical aim.”45 Such a use 
would allow us to say something about the objects that actually belong to these 
concepts, and not simply to assert that objects do belong to the ideas of reason. 
Yet, Kant says, we are not allowed to expand our cognition in this way, but only 
with regard to the practical use of pure reason. In the same way in which Kant 
claimed in the Third Critique that the idea of freedom can acquire objective reality, 
he claims it for immortality and God.46 
This discussion is in fact useful also as a qualification of the brief examina-
tion of the objective reality of freedom presented above. For Kant now says that 
the suprasensible objects that correspond to the ideas of reason cannot be further 
cognized even with the introduction of the practical necessary purpose deter-
mined by the moral law.21 For what is missing for the expansion of pure cognition 
in the theoretical direction is an intuition of the objects corresponding to the ideas 
of reason: 
Theoretical cognition, not indeed of these objects but of reason as such, has thereby 
been expanded insofar as through the practical postulates those ideas have after all 
been given objects, because a merely problematic thought has thereby for the first 
time acquired objective reality. This was, therefore, no expansion of the cognition 
of given suprasensible objects, but still an expansion of theoretical reason and of its 
cognition with regard to the suprasensible as such, insofar as theoretical reason 
was compelled to grant that there are such objects, even though it could not deter-
mine them more closely and hence could not itself expand this cognition of the ob-
jects (which have now been given to it on a practical basis and also only for practi-
cal use).47  
This long quotation clarifies some aspects of the status of the claims Kant makes. It 
seems that it is possible to distinguish between the following three categories of 
                                                 
45 Ibidem: “keine Erweiterung der Spekulation, d.i. um in theoretischer Absicht nunmehr einen posi-
tiven Gebrauch davon zu machen.” 
46 KpV, AA 5:135. 
47 Ibidem: “Aber dennoch ward das theoretische Erkenntnis, zwar nicht dieser Objekte, aber der 
Vernunft überhaupt, dadurch sofern erweitert, daß durch die praktischen Postulate jenen Ideen 
doch Objekte gegeben wurden, indem ein bloß problematischer Gedanke dadurch allererst objective 
Realität bekam. Also war es keine Erweiterung der Erkenntnis von gegebenen übersinnlichen 
Gegenständen, aber doch eine Erweiterung der theoretischen Vernunft und der Erkenntnis 
derselben in Ansehung des Übersinnlichen überhaupt, so fern als sie genötigt wurde, daß es solche 
Gegenstände gebe, einzuräumen, ohne sie doch näher bestimmen, mithin dieses Erkenntnis von den 
Objekten (die ihr nunmehr aus praktischem Grunde, und auch nur zum praktischen Gebrauche, 
gegeben worden).” 
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claims. First, there are claims about what there is (and these are theoretical claims), 
which are made with a view to a theoretical aim (for instance, that of creating 
a unified system of knowledge). Kant is quite clear that we are not entitled to such 
claims about the objects corresponding to the ideas of reason – all we obtain is 
doctrinal belief/faith. Second, there are those theoretical claims which are neces-
sary conditions for the possibility of a practical purpose. This is the case of the 
claims made by the postulates, but, again, Kant says we are entitled only to moral 
faith or belief and not to knowledge. Finally, there are practical claims, which are 
derived from the practical necessity of the moral law and which lead us to 
knowledge about what is right and what is wrong. Yet, this knowledge is not ac-
quired with a view to a theoretical, but to a practical aim. 
Now, the expansion of theoretical knowledge into the suprasensible realm 
that Kant talks about is nothing but an implication of the moral belief or faith ob-
tained when theoretical claims (especially those of the postulates) are vindicated 
as necessary conditions for moral purposes. The moral belief in the postulates turn 
the concepts corresponding to the ideas of reason from problematic notions to as-
sertoric ones, but without any knowledge of the content of these concepts. Since in 
this way we expand theoretical cognition and since we do this on the basis of the 
justification of our entitlement to belief or faith in the practical postulates, this jus-
tification has also an indirect epistemic character. Hence, there is a sense in which 
even the justification of moral faith or belief has an indirect epistemic character. 
This implies that epistemic justification includes reference not only to theo-
retical claims where access to the corresponding objects through sensible intuition 
is in principle possible or to practical claims where access to the corresponding 
objects is possible through reason’s ideas of good and evil, but includes also refer-
ence to claims concerning the objects corresponding to the ideas of reason, but 
claims made with a practical purpose in view. Yet, although this may seem to un-
dermine again the case for Kant’s political secularism, it becomes clear that the 
initial argument still holds. This is because the epistemic character of any religious 
claims concerning the existence of God or immortality of the soul has no other 
source of validity than that of the postulates and our assent to the postulates is 
moral faith/belief, rather than knowledge. 
6. Conclusion 
The Kantian argument for narrow secularism presented in this paper relies 
on the distinct epistemic statuses of moral and religious claims. According to Kant, 
the juridical principles on the basis of which a state is organised are distinct from 
ethical principles, but are nevertheless together with ethical principles part of 
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moral theory. As such, these claims have objectively sufficient grounds, which jus-
tify them as practical knowledge. By contrast, religious claims are theoretical 
claims whose objects go beyond our experience and cannot therefore be justified 
objectively. They are justified on the basis of subjectively sufficient grounds and 
represent the object of belief or faith. 
This Kantian argument for secularism was examined in this paper through 
a discussion of two main objections. First, we have considered one interpretation 
in the literature according to which the justification of practical claims is non- 
-epistemic and, hence, cannot provide objectively sufficient ground for practical 
claims. Secondly, we have discussed the view according to which, on Kant’s ac-
count, claims concerning the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are 
epistemic in a limited sense. Hence, even granting that moral claims can be justi-
fied as knowledge claims, it seems that on Kant’s account religious claims can be 
similarly justified too. As a result, the distinction between the distinct epistemic 
statuses of legal principles and religious claims is undermined and cannot support 
secularism even in the narrow form discussed here. 
After considering a weaker response which made appeal to the notion of 
conviction, the first objection was refuted by an investigation into Kant’s view 
of an objective ground of justification; the conclusion was that moral claims can 
have objectively sufficient grounds of justification and, therefore, are indeed forms 
of knowledge. I have then responded to the second objection by presenting the 
very limited sense in which Kant thinks some religious claims can be epistemically 
justified and have therefore a cognitive status. The conclusion was, however, that 
this limited sense only emphasised more clearly the different epistemic character 
of juridical principles and religious claims. 
One final note on another possible objection:48 in the third paragraph of Re-
ligion, Kant claims that morality inevitably leads to religion; from the perspective 
of my distinction between the epistemic statuses of moral and religious claims this 
seems impossible. I only note here, having to postpone any further discussion for 
another occasion, that a transition from moral claims (which are both objectively 
and subjectively sufficient) to religious claims (which are only subjectively suffi-
cient) seems unproblematic and need not go against my claim that the two types 
of claims have distinct epistemic statuses. A detailed discussion of this issue goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, but one last note can be usefully made here: any 
discussion of this Kantian claim in the third paragraph of Religion would need to 
                                                 
48 I am grateful to one of the referees for this paper for raising this point. 
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be read together with Kant’s claims at the beginning of Religion, claims according 
to which on its own behalf morality in no way needs religion.49 
It should be clear now that any further attempt to show that Kant’s relation 
to secularism is ambiguous or dismissive should take into consideration the ar-
gument from epistemic grounds presented here.50 
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